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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
L~XION PACIFIC RAILROAD 
COMPANY, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
- vs. -
EL PASO NATURAL GAS 
COMPANY, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
Case 
No. 10361 
The parties will be ref erred to as in the trial court. 
KATURE OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff, having paid damages to an employee of 
<lefendant who was injured due to plaintiff's negligence 
at a railroad crossing, seeks indemnification from de-
fendant under the terms of plaintiff's standard form of 
deed by which various pipeline easements had earlier 
h(·rn granted to defendant. 
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DISPOSITION IN 'I1HE LOWI~R CO-CRT 
After the case became at issue and the fact' • ' , :s wer~ 
ascertarned through discovery procedures, each part•, 
formally moved the trial court for summarv J'ud , 
• J gtnf'nt 
in its favor and, after argument and subsequent l'on, 
sideration of memoranda from both sides, the trial e-0urt 
entered summary judgment for the defendant and en-
tered its order denying plaintiff's motion. 
Plaintiff has appealed from the swnmary judgrne1t 
and attempts, also, as shown by its Notice of Apped 
and its brief, to appeal from the order denying its motion 1 
for summary judgment. An appeal does not lie from such 
an order. Haslam v. Paulsen (1964) 15 'Ctah 2d 185, 38~ 
P. 2d 736. 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
Since each party requested the trial court to enter 
summary judgment in its favor, it follows that each 
party represented to the court that there remained no 
"genuine issue as to any material fact" (Rule 56, ['.ah ' 
Rules of Civil Procedure). Plaintiff's representation 
was distinctly made in its motion ( R. 78) and was oral!:: 
reaffirmed to the trial judge, who specifically askNl 
counsel for plaintiff, before his oral argument began on 
March 4 1965 whether the issue to be submitted to the , 
' ' · the deed 
court was the interpretation of the paragraph m . . 
d ffirmativeh. relating to indemnity. Counsel answere a · 
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Despite this, plaintiff now asks this Court, in the 
,.,·ent plaintiff otherwise fails in this appeal, for a re-
rersal to permit a trial upon the merits. There is nothing 
about this case that suggests or requires a departtire 
from the rule announced by this Court in 1964, in reject-
ing a similar request in a case whire both parties had 
moved the trial court for summary judgment. Mastic 
Tde Dii:ision vs. Acme Distributing Compariy, 15 Utah 
~d Uii, 389 P. 2d 56. 
Plaintiff further erroneously asks the Court to view 
tlw facts in the way most favorable to plaintiff, appar-
Pntly assuming that, because thi~ appeal is taken from 
a ~muunary judgment, the ordinary rule in such cases 
must apply. 
As will be demonstrated in the argument in this 
hriet', the judgment of the trial court was completely 
correct and should be affirmed even if all factual infer-
t>nces are indulged in favor of plaintiff's position. 
However, this is not a proper case for application 
of the usual rule of "favorable indulgence" that applies 
to the court's review of a summary judgment. Since 
Loth parties submitted this controversy to the trial court 
for the purpose of obtaining its interpretation of a writ-
ten instrument, with the material facts not in dispute, 
this case, in truth, is more nearly analagou:s to the situa-
tion which arises when parties present to the court a 
<·ase upon an agreed statement of fact. 
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Here, the trial court had before it all the fact 1 · . . · spam 
tiff wanted it to consider, including statements · · m 14 
Responses to defendant's Request for Admission that are 
not just factual, but are supported by plaintiff's ver~ion 
of the inferences to be drawn therefrom. And, with all 
this factual and inferential weight upon the scales th· 
' trial court concluded plaintiff was not entitled to reliet'. 
Since the case was submitted to the trial court~ 
1 
if the facts were agreed, this •Court should indulge even , 
reasonable intendrnent in favor of the judgment and 
proceed to the basic problem of learning what faets werE 
before the trial court when it rendered its decision. 
To that end, defendant now sets forth a concise 
recitation of those faets, including many inferences urged 
by plaintiff both here and in the trial court. It is upon 
these facts and the law applicable to them that the trial 
court, five weeks after oral judgment, and two weeb 
after the last memorandum was submitted, ordered sum· 
mary judgment for defendant. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On March 13, 1956, plaintiff Union Pacific Railro~ 
Company for a total consideration of $826.97, preparetl. 
' f d ed to executed and delivered its standard form o e 
·r· N thwe~t defendant's predecessor in interest, Paci ic ·or ' 
. t al easement to 
Pipeline Corporation, grantmg a perpe u 
5 
rin• s(•paratP parcels of land, each 50 feet wide and 
:-<'\(•ral hmHlrPd fept long, for "construction, operation, 
1llaint1·1w1H·1•, n·pair, renewal, reconstruction and us2" 
,Ji a µ:as pipP lint>, ''togetlwr with the right of ingress 
anti .. µ:n·s~ to, from and upon" the strips of land and 
~uhj11 C't to tlu1 conditions, terms and limitations found 
:n tlH· d<'Pd, Exhibit "A" attached to plaintiff's com-
;ilaint ( R. G). 
Tlw dt>Pd provided that th(' defendant agreed to 
1rnl1·Hmi1\ and save harmless the plaintiff 
.. from and against any and all liability, loss, dam-
ag-e, elaims, demands, actions, causes of action, 
('Osts, and expenses of whatsoever nature, includ-
ing court eosts and attorneys' fees, growing out 
of injury or harm to or death of persons whom-
soPwr, or loss or destruction of or damage to 
propPrty whatsoever, including the pipe line [of 
tlw defendant] when such injury, harm, death, 
lo:-:-, <l<>strtwtion or damage, howsoever caused, 
g-rows out of or arises from the bursting of or 
IPaks in the pipe line, or in any other way what-
so;•vPr is duP to or arises because of the existence 
of tlw pipe line or the construction, operation, 
111aintenancP, repair, renewal, reconstruction or 
u.s<' of the pipe line or any part thereof, or to 
tlH• contPnts therPof or therefrom." 
Tlw pipP linP was installed shortly after delivery 
of tlw deed. Tlw railroad crossing, where the accident 
Ot'('UrrPd out of whieh this controversy arose, was north 
6 
and east of the pipe line. Between the crossin 1 . 1. g aJH1 t];., 
pipe me were other lands of the l)laintiff not d · . ' ~~ 
m the deed and also lands owned by others n t . . . . ' o part11·, 
to this smt, wluch extended to the north and to th' 
east of these parcels of land ( R. 43, -14). 
On November 30, 1963, defendant's employee Stacpi 
drove a truck across plaintiff's railroad tracks at a cru~:. 
ing and sustained injuries when struck by plaintilf') 
train. The tracks were located upon a railroad right of 
way owned by Oregon Short Line Railroad Co. and lPased 
by it to plaintiff. Prior to 1930, Oregon Short Line con· 
structed the crossing over its tracks and plaintiff ha~ 
maintained the crossing for many years (R. 42, 44). 
At the time of the accident, Stacey was not on any 
of the ground described by the deed, and at that time 
he was not engaged in making any repairs or performing 
any maintenance or work on the pipe line of defendant, 
but was enroute to the pipe line right of way for tl1t 
purpose of reaching a particular point on the pipe line 
where he was to show those who were following him 
in another truck what work was to be perfonned by the 
latter on the pipe line at that point (R. 151, 152). 
The route Stacey had intended to follow, and would 
have followed but for the accident, was generally to the 
south up to and across the railroad tracks of plaintiff, 
' . ri ht 
then south across the south portion of the railroad g 
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ot' way, tlH·n across plaintiff's land contiguous to and 
iut11wdiately south of the right of way vwhich lands were 
not uwntionPd or described in the deed), then over a 
\,rnlgP aeross a ereek, and then across lands of others, 
Jwadiuµ: g-enerally to the west to a point ~ to % mile 
~outh and % mih~ or more west of the crossing where 
tli(' aee.idPnt oeeurred (R. 46, 47). 
During the course of the intended route of travel 
i'Jtae('Y would have entered upon and crossed over plain-
~1ff's lands not described in the deed, would have crossed 
uwr thP lands of others, then would have entered upon 
and erosst>d over plaintiff's land which surrounded the 
;>U-fuot parcels, and would then have come upon one or 
mon, of said parcels where the pipe line was located 
(IL -ts). 
ln short, neither the tracks nor the crossing nor the 
:-::nrrounding railroad right of way nor the property just 
to thP south thereof was immediately contiguous to any 
property dt•scribed in the deed (R. 43, 47, 48). 
Stae(•y fih•d suit against plaintiff February 4, 1964, 
~PPking damages for his personal injuries caused by 
plaintiff's negligence in the crossing accident of Novem-
lH·r :m, 1 %~), and on ~lay 7, 1964, plaintiff gave notice 
and t(·ndert>d to defendant the defense of Stacey's suit. 
ThP tender was declined and the suit was settled by 
j;lainti ff's payuwnt to Stacey of $340,000. Plaintiff then 
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brought this action, demanding indemnity from def d en -
ant upon the basis of the language in plaintiff's det'<l 
as previously quoted herein. ' 
In the months prior to the execution of the deed in 
March, 1956, and for the following period of more than 
six years and eight months until the date of Stacev's 
accident on November 30, 1963, plaintiff never had ~m 
conscious, fixed, subjective intent to grant to defenda~t 
or its predecessor in interest any right to the use of 
the roadway and crossing over the tracks it leased from 
Oregon Short Line Railroad, and, instead, the right of 
ingress and egress mentioned in the deed was intended 
to refer to ingress and egress over the areas of land 
owned by plaintiff immediately surrounding the parcels 
of land described in the deed (R. 51). 
During the negotiations between plaintiff and Pacific 
Northwest prior to the deed covering the easements, 
plaintiff's representatives pointed out that plaintiff was 
not then exposed to any risk from a pipe line, simply 
because no pipe line existed and that while plaintiff was 
willing to grant easements upon its land to permit pipe 
line construction, it expected to be "in just that good a 
position after the pipe line was constructed" (R. 50). 
Plaintiff's representatives also stated at that time 
that plaintiff would draft the instruments of conveyance 
"in a form acceptable to plaintiff" and "designed to in-
9 
sun• to the maximum possible extent that plaintiff was 
and would be as fully protected as possible against any 
risk or exposure to risk" which would be "created or 
arise by virtue of the construction of or the existence 
and operation of said pipe line" (R. 50). 
The "facts" set forth in the two previous paragraphs 
arP found in plaintiff's expository and argumentative 
t't'sponse to defendant's Request for Admission No. 9 
(R. .+9, 50, 51). Presumably, the response represents the 
most favorable information plaintiff could offer on the 
controlling issue in this case - the intent of the parties 
3$ rPvf'ah'd by their negotiations and by the deed. 
It is therefore highly significant that, despite such 
rPritation of the detailed recollection of its representa-
tives who participated in the negotiations, plaintiff was 
forced to concede it could find no "written record of, 
nor "·itness with personal recollection of, arvy discussion 
or negotiation on the subject of indemnity" (R. 50) 
\emphasis ours). 
From this it follows there was never any discussion 
hetween the representatives of the parties on the more 
spPcific and controlling question of whether there would 
be responsibility and liability, in indemnity or otherwise, 
upon Pacific Northwest, and thus upon this defendant, 
for thf' negligence of plaintiff. 
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Although plaintiff now contends that, despite th\' 
foregoing facts, the deed it drew was intended to providP 
indemnity against loss resulting in whole, or in part, 
from plaintiff's own conduct, the deed itself does not 80 
state. either in clear and specific terms, or at all (R. 10). 
The foregoing facts and inferences were all before 
thA trial court for its consideration. Since plaintiff char-
acterizes the procedure in this case as "somewhat un-
usual" and since its brief (pp. 7-8) implies this most 
important case was pre-judged by the trial court, with a 
closed-mind attitude, the record should be set straight. 
Such implications constitute an unwarranted disserviceto 
Judge Ellett who told plaintiff's counsel, after expressing 
his preliminary view at the first hearing February 19, 
1965: 
"Well, maybe I had better let you argue it to 
somebody then because this is a matter of con-
siderable importance and shouldn't be jumped at. 
I have a feeling now on it, and I don't see how you 
can possibly do it, but some other judge mi~ht 
see it and certainly he ought to have the tlllle 
to co~sider it and to read your cases and listen 
to your argument in full." (R. 160, 161). 
Thereafter, and without objection from plaintiff's 
. · f for counsel, it was agreed both sides would file mo ions 
summary judgment and that full argument would be 
heard by Judge Ellett March 4, 1965. On that date, be-
11 
ginning at 8 :00 a.m., in open court, counsel argued for 
~lightly more than two hours. 
Further, plaintiff submitted its memorandum of 
more than 23 pages. Defendant then submitted a memo-
randum almost as long. Plaintiff filed a reply memo-
randum. All three memoranda are in this record. The 
trial cou:rt's notes, made upon the margin of plaintiff's 
principal memorandum, reflect not only consideration 
of its contents, but examination of cited authorities as 
well. The court entered its order directing summary 
judgment 15 days after it received the second of plain-
tiff's two memoranda of authorities (R. 136). 
ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECT'L Y DE-
TERMINEn THAT PLAINTIFF WAS N<Yl' 
ENTITLED TO INDEMNIFICATiON FROM 
DEFENDANT UNDER THE TERMS OF 
THE DEED, AND 'THE SUMMARY JUDG-
~'LE.N"T SHOULD BE AFFIRMED. 
Earlier this year, this Court succintly stated the 
principles of law that should control the determination 
of the fUjlldamental question in this case - the intention 
of the parties. In Ba.rrus v. Wilkinson (1965), 16 Utah 
2d 204, 398 P. 2d 207, which involved the legal interpreta-
12 
tion of a paragraph relating to indemnity in a lease, the 
Court said: 
. "In inte_rpreting a prov1s10n m a contract, 
this court will try to determine the intention f 
the parties, and a defendant, normally, is bou~d 
only to the extent the terms expressly indicate 
o_r at l~a~t fairly a~d rea_sonably imply an obliga'. 
hon ( citm~ cases _mvolvmg ordii;iary contracts). 
vVhere an indemnity agreement is involved it is 
generally held that the agreement wul not be con-
strued to cover losses to the indemnitee caused 
by his own negligent acts unless such itntention 
is expressed clearly and unequivocally. Especially 
is this true where an affirmative act of negligence 
is involved." (Emphasis ours.) 
Plaintiff, in its brief, (p. 42) concedes this to be the 
rule. 
Two other fundamental propositions of law should 
also be noted at the outset. The first is that the Court 
cannot rewrite a contract for the parties nor enforce 
upon them one of the Court's own making. Genola Town 
v. Santaquin City (19-±1), 100 Utah 62, 110 P. 2d 372, 
East Millcreek Water Co. v. Salt Lake City (1945), lOS 
Utah 315, 159 P. 2d 863. 
The second basic proposition is that doubtful por-
tions of a contract should be construed against the party 
who draws it. Huber & Rowland Construction v. City of 
South Salt Lake (1958), 7 Utah 2d 273, 323 P. 2d 258. 
1 
I 
I 
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'L'his was F nion Pacific's contract, its standard form of 
deed which it insisted it would prepare to its liking. If 
it wanted to be protected against its own negligence, why 
did it not say so, in clear, unmistakable language? 
If it wanted someone else to assume an "open-end" 
liability without foreseeable limit, why did it not say 
so in the deed it insisted upon preparing! Why did it 
not prepare that deed in language that anyone could 
understand, so that Pacific Northwest and its successors 
would have been given definite notice, in clear and un-
mistakable terms, that they would be required to assume 
and pay for losses, whether catastrophic or not, caused 
by someone over whom they could have no control! 
The plain fact is, Union Pacific never intended to 
be so protected. The admitted facts clearly establish 
that neither of the parties mentioned in the deed ever 
had any intent to agree upon the claimed indemnity, 
but plaintiff now asserts the Court should, nevertheless, 
detPrmine that they did agree upon it. 
The parties never contemplated or discussed the 
use of the crossing, which had been in existence for years, 
hut plaintiff now asserts the Court should, nevertheless, 
determine that they did contemplate it and did discuss 
the ramifications of its use, including loss resulting from 
plaintiff's negligent operation of its trains upon it. 
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The parties never contemplated nor discus:sed either 
the negligence of the railroad or the liability of defendant 
for such negligence, but plaintiff now asserts tlw Court 
should, nevertheless, determine that they did so. 
Such assertions, heedless of the true intent of the 
parties, unmindful of their discussions and negotiatiom, 
and regardless of the nature of the circumstances of 
the transaction, are but subtle artifices of counsel who, 
armed with 20/20 hindsight, now seek to extricate their 
client from the effects of a $340,000 case of negligence. 
Aside from the complete absence of discussion or 
negotiation between the parties on the subject of indemn-
ity for loss due to plaintiff's own conduct, the language 
utilized by plaintiff in its deed is illuminating. Except 
for loss which might have arisen because of bursting of, 
or leaks in, the pipe line, neither of which is involved 
here, the indemnity paragraph in the deed provides 
for indemnification only for loss which "is due to or 
arises because of the existence of the pipe line or the 
construction, operation, maintenance, repair, renewal, 
reconstruction or use of the pipeline ... " (Ernphasi~ 
added.) 
The loss in question was due to, and arose because, 
Union Pacific was negligent at its crossing. Union Pa-
cific had no loss "because of the existence of the pipe 
" al" line'' or because of its "maintenance" or renew · 
l 
i 
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Plaintiff in its brief resorts to selections from the 
dictionary dl:'finition of the word "cause." To read the 
definition fully is instructive. Webster's International 
Dietionary, :2d Edition, defines the word "cause" as: 
"That which occasions or effects a result; 
the nPcessary antecedent of an effect; that which 
dekrmines the condition or existence of a thing, 
P~pecially that which determines its change from 
one form to another.'' (Emphasis added.) 
There can be no doubt that the "necessary ante-
cedent" of the accident and thus the loss in this case 
and that which "effected" the result, was the negligence 
of the plaintiff. The pipe line could have been in exist-
L'nce a thousand years, and it could have been renewed 
and maintained daily or even hourly and there would 
have been no accident and no loss to the plaintiff until 
the neces,1.;ar.11 antecedent fact - plaintiff's negligence -
occurred. 
To say, as urged by plaintiff, that the existence, 
maintenance or operation of the pipe line caused Stacey's 
injuries is to substitute sophistry for common sense. 
l'.ndn thi:;; reasoning, it could as easily be argued, had 
Stacey lwen :;;truck by a Union Pacific train and injured 
at a erossing in Kemmerer, 'Vyoming, while enroute to 
the pipe line an hour before the accident, that his injury 
was due to or arose because of the existence, maintenance 
or operation of the pipe line. If such a statement were 
16 
v~id,, then by the same reasoning, it would make no 
d1ff erence if his injury had occurred even more remotely 
as he crossed the Wyoming state line, en route to the 
pipe line. 
The basic reason for rejection of such an argument 
has been well stated by Professor Prosser as follows: 
"In a philosophical sense, the consequences of 
an act go forward to eternity, and the causes of 
an event go back to the discovery of America 
and beyond. 'The fatal trespass done by Eve 
was the cause of all our woe.' But any attempt 
to impose responsibility upon such a basis would 
result in infinite liability for all wrongful acts, 
and would 'set society on edge and fill the courts 
with endless litigation.' As a practical matter, 
legal responsibility must be limited to those causes 
which are so closely connected with the result 
and of such significance that the law is justified 
in imposing liability. Some boundary must be set 
to liability for the consequences of any act, upon 
the basis of some social idea of justice or policy." 
Prosser on Torts ( 2d Ed.), 218, 219, Sec. 44, 
Causation in Fact. 
Plaintiff confuses the stage with the actors, the 
circumstances surrounding an injury with the cause of 
the injury. 
'The principal point of plaintiff's brief, as found in 
its Point I and the following 28-page argument, only 
serves to confound the confused position it has asserted. 
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lt begins with the confident pronouncement (p. 13) that 
defendant relies upon the concept of "proximate cause" 
- that there would be no indemnity for loss not "prox-
imately caused" by the existence, use, operation and 
maintenance of the pipe line. 
Having set up this "straw man," plaintiff then 
launches an attack to destroy it. The fact is, defendant 
has never based its principal defense upon the test of 
the tort law doctrine of proximate cause. Defendant's 
memorandum to the trial court does not even contain 
the phrase ( R. 82-103). ·The "straw man," as a principal 
defense, exists only in plaintiff's argument. 
1The test here is the traditional test of contract law:· 
what was the intent and contemplation of the parties, 
measured by their prior discussions and negotiations, 
as merged into the agr~ement in controversy. 
::\Ieasured by that test, and by the conceded rule 
that an agreement to indemnify one for his own negli-
gence must be stated "clearly and unequivocally" (Barrus 
r. Wilkinson, supra), the argument here must be held 
not to provide indemnity. There is ample precedent 
in accord. 
In reaching the decision in Barrus v. Wilkinson, this 
Court cited, as supporting authority, the holding of the 
Supreme Court of California in Vimnell vs. Pacific Elec-
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tric Railway Co. (1959), 340 P. 2d 604. Significantlv ti, 
• ' I~ 
V innell case is strikingly similar in its facts to the ca~l' 
at bar. It involved an action for damages caused wlwn 
a locomotive and freight cars on the railway company 
were switched into an open excavation maintained IJy 
Vinnell Co. on railway property, while constructing~ 
stonn drain. This construction had required the railway 
company to take up portions of its tracks while Yinnell 
Co. excavated a ditch, and the railway employees negli-
gently aligned a switch in such a way as to direct a train 
along a track which had been terminated at the excava-
tion. 
Before Vinnell entered upon railroad property to 
begin its work, the railroad granted it an easement to 
use railroad lands for the storm drain. The easement 
was prepared by the railroad and contained a paragraph 
relating to indemnity, which read, to the Pxtent pertinent 
here, as follows : 
"8. Contractor (Vinnell) agrees to indemnify 
and save Railroad harmless from and against any 
and all ... loss, damage and liability, howso.eve.r 
same rnay be caused, resulting directly or mdi-
rectly from the performance of any or all work 
to be done upon the property and . beneat!t th~ 
tracks of railroad and upon the premises adJacen 
thereto ... " (Emphasis ours.) 
·The railway contended, as does Union Pacific he~e, 
that this broad language evidenced an intent to be m· 
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demnifif'd for its own negligence. 'The Supreme Court 
ot' California, in rejecting that contention, said: 
"
1The courts have consistently adopted the 
position that indemnification clauses are to be 
strictly construed against the indemnitee in cases 
involving affirmative acts of negligence on his 
part ... 
"Both by precedent and good reason, if an 
indemnitor ... is to be made responsible for the 
negilgent acts of an indemnitee over whose con-
duct it has no control, the langauge imposing such 
liability should do so expressly and unequivocally 
so that the contracting party is advised in definite 
terms of the liability to which it is exposed. The 
indemnification clause in the present case, by not 
expressly stating that the defendant was protected 
against acts of its own negligence, failed to meet 
this requirement." (Emphasis supplied.) 
The italicized language of the agreement is the same 
as the language on which Union Pacific relies in the case 
at bar. 
The emphasized language of the decision directly 
applies to the facts here because this defendant had no 
control over Union Pacific's conduct, there was no ex-
press and unequivocal language and defendant could not 
have been advised "in definite terms" of the liability 
now sought to be fastened upon it. 
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There is ample and respected opm10n elsewlwr" 
which supports defendant here. The annotated opinio~ 
of the Fifth Circuit ·Court of Appeals is replete with 
case citations and text authorities on this subject in 
Batso~Cook Co. v. Industrial Steel Erectors (1958), 257 
F. 2d 410, where the claimed indemnity arose from the 
Standard Form of Subcontract in which the subcontrac-
tor 
" ... assumes entire responsibility for losses, 
expenses, demands and claims in connection with 
or arising out of any injury ... to any person ... 
alleged to have been sustained in connection with 
or to have arisen out of or resulting from the 
performance of the work by the subcontractor ... 
and agrees to indemnify and hold harmless Con-
tractor ... from any and all such losses ... " 
In an observation which in pointedly pertinent here, 
the Court noted the facts were not in dispute and neitlwr 
was the law and stated: 
"Indemnitee and indemnitor, in briefs which 
reflect the consummate skill of articulate crafts-
men in exhaustive research that leaves naught 
for independent probing by us, are at one on what 
the law is, not only generally, but in Alabama 
and in the Fifth Circuit as well ... They are thus 
in complete agreement that the problem i~exor­
ably begins and ends as one of construc~ion ~f 
the specific contractual tenns, and that m this 
process it is the law which steps in and t~lls th~ 
parties that while it need not be done m an) 
r 
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particular language or form, unless the imtention 
is unequivocally expressed in the plainest of 
words, the law will consider that the parties did 
not undertake to indemnify one against the con-
sequences of his own negligence." (Emphasis 
ours.) 
The arguments advanced by Union Pacific in its 
brief are reminiscent of the contentions of unsuccessful 
counsel in the Baston-Cook case. They were dispatched 
by the Court with these comments, also particularly 
aµpropriate here: 
"But we do not think that these arguments 
are persuasive, nor do we believe that the matter 
can or ought to be resolved by matching this or 
that case against language which, by the very na-
ture of things, varies as scriveners set out to draft 
these instruments or businessmen uncritically put 
their signatures on printed traditional forms. The 
problem, as we said before, begins and ends as 
one of construction in the light of general prin-
c1 ples that are now so well rooted that the business 
world must reckon with them. 
"The phrase stressed heavily is indeed broad. 
But the broad, all-inclusiveness of langauge used 
is itself one of the indicia which the law regards 
as insufficient. The purpose to impose this ex-
traordinary liability on the Indemnitor must be 
spelled out in unmistakable terms. It cannot come 
from reading into the general words used the 
fullest meaning which lexicography would permit. 
In the atmosphere which the general principles 
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~·eflect, the phrase i8 ~·(_•ally ~ut a means of defin-
~ng th.e sc.op: of th: mdemmty, that i::;, the area 
~n whi~h it i.~ apphca~le, not th.e legal reach of 
i.t on~e it ~PiilH'8. In .tlns respect it ::;erves a usdul 
function m broadenmg the physical and actual 
situations \vhich might be covered. (Emphasi~ 
ours.) 
"·while the language is well adapted to defin-
ing the areas of the application, it is not peculiarly 
apt to define causes either in tenns of physic~ 
or legal responsibility. An injurious incident could 
arise out of or result from, or be sustained, in 
connection with the performance of the work 
whether the real or legal cause was that of the 
Indemnitor, the Indemnitee, or both, or equally 
likeiy, unrelated third parties. And to these ques-
tions as to what partie8 brought about the inci-
dent, there would have to be added inquiry 
whether any of those actually resposible for it 
were so in law. If it could cover any one or all 
of the three actual possibilties and any one or aE 
of the legal possibilities, it has hardly spelled out 
that it will cover the specific and limited, but Ber-
ious, situation of negligence by the Indemnitee. 
Of course that is just the very reason for the gen-
eral principle now universally accepted. For thi~ 
general approach is bottomed on the concept that 
this must be specifically, not generally prescribed. 
It is an area in which to cover all does not include 
one of the parts. Despite this emphasized phrase, 
it is apparent that the clause is lacking in that 
positive directness which the law regards as essen-
tial.", 
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Particularly appropriate also to the present case is 
the language of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the First Circuit in Turner Construction Co. v. W. J. 
Halloran &ted Erection Co. (1957), 240 F. 2d 441. It is 
appropriate because plaintiff here contends that the 
Court should find an intent to indemnify plaintiff, re-
gardless of the amount of the loss, even though the 
suhjPct of indemnity was never discussed, and even 
tltough the liability which might be thereby thrust upon 
<iPf'pndant for plaintiff's negligence would be practically 
limitless. The First Circuit disposed of a similar con-
tention in a case where Turner, a general contractor, 
claimed indemnity against a subcontractor for a loss the 
Turner Company had sustained because of its own negli-
gence. The contract had the following indemnity provi-
s10n: 
"The subcontractor hereby assumes entire 
responsibility and liability in and for any and 
all damage or injury of any kind or nature what-
ever to all persons, whether employees or other-
wise, and to all property growing out of or result-
ing from the execution of the work provided in 
this Contract or occuring in connection therewith, 
and agrees to indemnify and save harmless, Turn-
er, its agents, servants and employees from and 
against any and all loss, expense including attor-
ney's fees, damages or injury growing out of or 
resulting from or occurring in connection with 
the execution of the work herein provided." 
24 
The Court went on to say: 
"Construed literally, the indemnitv prov1·,· . ht b . . . ~lOil ~1g_ . e mte,rpreh~,d m. such a way as to imposP 
hab1hty ?~ 8teel Erection. But to so interpM 
the prov1s10n would be to construe it strictly 
against the indemnitor, for which there is n~ 
authority in Rhode Island or anywhere else ~o 
far as we know . . . In Rhode Island, as generally 
elsewhere, indemnity contracts of the kind unde.r 
consideration are construed strictly against the 
indemnitee, with the result that an understandin~ 
fo indemnify against the indemnitee's own negli-
gence will not be inf erred from doubtful language, 
but must be clearly and unequivocally expressed. 
Obviously there is no such clear and unequivocal 
language in the contract under consideration.'' 
It must now be apparent to the Court, from the 
cases cited in the opinions of the California Supreme 
Court and the United States ·Courts of Appeal, that ther" 
are literally hundreds of cases which have decided ques-
tions of indemnity such as that presented here . .:\len• 
quotation of continuing numbers of these decisions can 
serve no useful purpose. We shall therefore now con-
fine ourselves to those opinions which furnish the reason, 
the sound basis, for our contention in this case. 
8uch a decision was rendered by the Eighth Circuit 
Court of Appeals in 1953, in Ocean Accident & Guaraufft' 
Corp. v. Jan.sen, 203 F. 2d GS2, where a lease provided 
that 
~ 
I 
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·• ... Lessee will protect the Lessor and save 
Lessor harmless against any claims or demands 
for damage ... arising from any cause connected 
with th<=' use of the premises, or arising from any 
accident, injury or damage whatsoever, however 
caused to any person ... " (Emphasis ours.) 
The Court should note the underlined words in the 
alww quotation. They are very close to the words in the 
<ll·Pd in this case - words on which Union Pacific, in 
pffrrt, n•sts its Pntire case. 
In Jans en, an injury resulted from lessor's negli-
g"l;nt construction of stairs in the leased premises. The 
L\rnrt of Appeals affirmed the trial court's conclusion 
that, <ll':-;pite the sweeping language quoted, the lessee 
should not be required to indemnify the lessor for its own 
nt>gligence. In reasoning to its conclusion, the Court 
quoted the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals decision 
in North American Ry. Construction Co. v. Cincinnati 
Traction Co., 172 F. 214. The language quoted goes right 
tothe heart of the present case and to the basic reason 
for denying indemnity: 
''Contracts of indemnity such as the one here 
sued upon, are usually intended to provide against 
loss or liability of one party, through the opera-
tions of the other, or caused by physical conditions 
that are under the control of the other - over 
uo71 ich the party indemnified has no control, and 
the party indemnifying has control. Indeed, it 
\rnuld tah elear language to show that a contract 
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of indemnity was intended to cover condi't· . ions o~ 
operations under the control of the part11 ind, · 
f · d d ·' t.m111 . . ie , an not und~r t~e control of the indemnih. 
mg !?arty, such, for n_ista.nces, as accidents, tl;~ 
proxm_iate ca':s~ o~, wluch is the negligence of the 
party mdemmf ied. (Emphasis ours.) 
In the present case, the train which smashed Stacey 
was under the exclusive control of lTnion Pacific. ir 
Union Pacific, in truth and in fact, had intended to 
require defendant to indemnify it for negligence in thP 
operation of its own trains - over which it had exclusiw 
control - it could have said so, it should have said 80, 
but when it drew its deed, it did not say so and, mor~ 
to the point, it did not say so in "clear and unequivocal'' 
language. 
Although it concedes the "clear and unequivocal" 
rule, the railroad finds it necessary to set up the ''straw 
man" of proximate cause, only to strike it down with the 
scornful epithet "red herring." By devious reasoning, 
the railroad finds "clear and unequivocal" expression 
in broad general language and, equally devious, finds 
a mutual intent and contemplation of the parties despite 
the fact they never entertained an idea or exchanged a 
thought or word, printed or verbal, on the critical sub-
ject of indemnity against plaintiff's own conduct. 
·The railroad chooses to ignore the fact that its 
broad language deals only with the manner of producing 
an effect. Its deed is silent on the subject of the person,, 
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or actors against whose conduct it is to be indemnified. 
It says only "howsoever caused," not by "whomsoever 
caused." It thus speaks only of the action and not the 
actor. 
As is apparent during any analysis of the language 
sPlPcted by the railroad, it may be many things, but it is 
not dear and unequivocal. Its generality, rather than a 
virtue, is its very vice. 
Plainly and simply, the language in plaintiff's deed 
fails the "clear and unequivocal" test, and since the place 
where Stacey was hurt and the tra1n that hurt him were 
under the control of the plaintiff, nothing less than a 
"dear and unequivocal" intent to indemnify is absolutely 
necessary to plaintiff's case. Such an intent was not 
in l~nion Pacific, not in Pacific Northwest, and is not 
in this case. 
A close examination of the cases principally relied 
upon by plaintiff in its brief reveals situations clearly 
distinguishable from the present facts. Heaviest reliance 
appears to be placed upon Alabama Great So. R.R. vs. 
Louisville & Nashville R. Co. (5th Cir. 1955), 224 F. 2d 1. 
In that case a Standard Detour Agreement adopted, 
promulgated, and in use for years by the Association 
of American Railroads used the phrase "in whatever 
manner the same may be caused." Chief Justice Hutche-
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son speaking for the 5th Circuit Court of Appeals said 
that this descriptive phrase did not require that ti 
1 . "ff le p amti show "in the technical legal sense proxiruatP 
causal connection between the operation of the detouring 
train and the damages." 
Even more fundamental, the agreement said: 
". . . in whatever manner the same may he 
caused or occasioned, whether by or through the 
negligence of the Home Company ... or by reason 
of defects in tracks, structures,or facilities fur-
nished by the Home Company or otherwise .... " 
As well they might, counsel for Union Pacific readilv 
confess this case to be quite different from the case now 
before the Court. (Brief p. 23). The basic differences 
are that the negligence of Home was clearly contemplated 
and, therefore, clearly stated, and the loss occurred be-
cause trains collided on the very tracks which wNe thi> 
subject of the Standard Detour Agreement and not, as 
~n this case, at a point far removed from the place and 
the subject matter of the deed. 
In a brief which warned the Court in advance that 
defendant would rely on decisions, some of which "will 
be old," Union Pacific places almost equal stress on the 
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals decision, 29 years ago, 
in Cacey v. Virginia.n Ry. Co., 85 F. 2d 977. In that ease 
the Virginian Railway Co. exacted an encroachment lease 
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from Cacey covering steps leading down to a railroad 
track crossed by a path which was stated as constituting 
a "walkway" which was necessary for Cacey's employees 
and families living on one side of the track to use to 
get to the other side. The indemnity agreement provided 
that Cacey save Virginian harmless from any and all 
claims by reason or in consequence of the occupancy 
or the use of the premises or of the property of the rail-
way company adjacent thereto. 
Okley Stike, 8 years of age, was struck and seriously 
injured by a passenger train while attempting to cross 
the track. He had just descended the steps in question 
and was standing on the ties when struck by a train. 
It was contended that the lease agreement did not in-
demnify the railway company for injuries caused solely 
by its negligence. The Circuit Court disagreed. 
Circuit Judge Parker's dissent, reflecting the great 
weight of authority as shown by the frequency of its 
quotation in the cases, pointed out the absence of causal 
relationship between the injury and the use of the cross-
ing, drawing the distinction between the cause of an 
injury and a mere condition without which it would not 
have occurred. 
'The Cacey majority opinion cannot serve as author-
ity in the present case where a crossing right was not 
even contemplated and the indemnity agreement is silent 
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as to injuries arising by reason or in consequence of the 
use of the crossing. 
Eight years later, the Fourth Circuit had before it 
Southern Ry. Co. v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. (4th 'Cir. 
1944), 145 F. 2d 304. Southern brought suit against'Coea 
Cola under an indemnity agreement given incident to the 
construction by Coca Cola of a warehouse adjacent tu 
Southern 's tracks. The agreement recited that the "exer-
cise of the privilege herein granted" might create risk~ 
or loss which would not othrwise arise "except for such 
use" (which plaintiff here contends was part of tlw 
discussion between the parties before the date of the 
deed) and the agreement then went on to cover 
"any property loss or damage, death or personal 
injury whatever, accruing or suffered or sustained 
from or by reason of any act, negligence or default 
of the licensee (Coca Cola), its agents, servanIB 
or employees in or about or in connection '\ith 
the exercise of the privilege ... granted or which 
may in any manner or any extent be attributable 
thereto or to the presence of the warehouse of the 
licensee ... whether or not negligence on the part 
of the railway company ... may have caused or 
contributed to the loss, injury or damage, except 
that the licensee shall not be held responsible for 
any loss of life or personal injury, or damage. to 
cars or property of the raaway company, accr~mg 
from its own negligence, without fault of the licen-
see, its servants or employees." 
T 
1. 
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A brakeman employed by Southern was brushed 
from a ear by the warehouse and badly injured. The 
trial judge held that the damage fell within the exception 
and the Circuit Court affirmed. The Circuit Court said: 
"This contract was drawn by Southern. It 
was signed, as so drawn, by Coca Cola without 
the change of a word. When the words of a con-
tract are ambiguous, it is a well-known and worthy 
maxim of our law that such ambiguity should 
be resolved against the party that drew the con-
tract and selected its terminology and nomen-
clature." 
The court also cited the general rule of construction, 
referring with approval to the language of Circuit Judge 
Parker in the Cacey case. This case was decided by 
.Judge Parker, Soper and Dobie. Dobie wrote the deci-
sion. Soper dissented, stating that this ease is stronger 
for the indemnitee than the Cacey case because in that 
ease it was not expressly agreed that the Railway Com-
pany might recover notwithstanding negligence on its 
part in creating the situation. 
The Cacey decision was distinguished in Kansas 
City So. Ry. Co. v. New Englalnd Fire Ins. Co. (8th Cir. 
1943), 133 F. 2d 973, involving a lease of adjacent prop-
erty for a canning factory and an indemnity agreement 
which provided: 
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"The lessee agrees to indemnify the railw , co~pany and save it hannless from any and ~l 
clanns and expenses that may arise or may 1 
made for death, injury, loss or damage resulti~<~ 
to the railway company's employees or propert,~ 
or to other persons or their property, by rea.~~~ 
or in consequence of the occupancy or use of said 
premises by the lessee." 
·The court pointed out that the lease involved in thP 
Cacey case was made for the purpose of prott>cting tlw 
railway company against the acquisition of rights in tht· 
use of its property through the operation of limitations 
and that in this case the agreement did not expressly 
reflect an intention of the railway company to protect 
itself from loss or damage to the property of the lessees 
by reason of the operation of the railroad. 
The court said further : 
"Moreover, we think it cannot be said that 
the loss in this case was caused by the occupancy 
of the premises by the lessees. On the other hand, 
the loss was caused by the acts of appellant's em-
ployees engaged in the operation of the railroad.'' 
This language is peculiarly appropriate for consider-
ation in this case since 1J nion Pacific's loss here wa.' 
caused bv its negligence in operating its trains and tlw 
operatio~, maintenance and existence of the pipe line 
had no part in Stacey's accident. 
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The cases otherwise discussed or cited by plaintiff 
as aiding its principal thrust in this case prove, upon 
examination, either to involve accidents occurring at the 
precise place where the work involved in the contract 
was to be performed or to involve facts completely dis-
similar to this case. 
rl'ypical is Ryan Mercantile Co. v. Great Northern 
Railu·ay Co. (1961 9th C.C.A.), 294 F. 2d 629. Incredibly, 
plaintiff says it is "almost identical" on its facts to the 
case at bar. We need to say nothing more than to point 
out that the agreement there provided for indemnity 
"whether due to negligence of Great Northern" or not. 
How Ryan can become "almost identical" with our 
case when it has that language in its agreement can only 
Ire determined by the legalistic legerdemain replete in 
plaintiff's approach to this case. 
Similar magic is utilized by plaintiff in urging the 
Court that a decision of a "Wyoming federal judge, 
applying \Vyoming law, to a Wyoming case" is in accord 
with plaintiff's theory of this case. The case is O. &N. W. 
Ry. C~. v. Rissler (D. C. Wyo. 1960), 184 Fed. Supp. 98 
and again, examination of that case reveals the indemnity 
agreement before that court contained an express pro-
vision by which the railroad was to be indemnified 
against loss "even though the operation of the Railway 
Company's railroad may have caused or contributed 
thereto." 
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These other points urged by plaintiff should be n ien-
tioned. First, plaintiff claims that it is defendant's posi-
tion that the deed is ineffective to establish liability bi>-
·cause it does not mention the word "negligence." This 
is but another "straw man'' because defendant has never 
so contended. The Court will note that the second casp 
we cited, and on which we rely, in this argument con-
tained the flat statement that an agreement to be in-
demnified for one's own negligence need not be in "any 
particular language or form" but the intention to in-
demnify must, nevertheless, be "unequivocally expressed 
in the plainest of words." Batson-Cook v. lnd1tstrial 
Steel Erectors (1958 5 C.C.A.), 251 F. 2d 410. 
Second, plaintiff says defendant has contended 
Stacey was not in the course of his employment at the 
time of the accident and that this is of importance on thr 
question of interpretation of the agreement. 
Again, defendant has not relied upon, and does not 
now rely upon, any such theory in this case. As shown 
by the record (R. 101), defendant urged in the trial court 
that whether or not Stacey was in the scope of his em-
ployment had no bearing on the construction of this 
contract. We reiterate that position and refer the Court 
to a federal decision which specifically holds in accord. 
See Employer Casualty Co. v. Howard T. Foley Co., foe. 
(5th C.C.A. 1946), 158 F. 2d 363. 
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As a make weight, the railroad asserts that an 
easement at the crossing was granted by implication. 
Before responding to this assertion it may be well to 
repeat ct>rtain of the pivotal facts. (1) The railroad 
does not now and never has owned the crossing, and 
(:2) the crossing and the lands deeded for the pipe line 
have never been parts of the same estate. 
EasPments by implication arise under certain condi-
tions but only upon "severance of an estate by a sale of 
a part thereof .... " Adamson, et ux. v. Brockbank, et al., 
112 Utah 52, 185 P. 2d 246 (1947); the first requirement 
is: "Unity of title followed by severance." Morris v. 
Blunt, 49 Utah 243, 161P.1127 (11916), Savage v. Nielsen, 
et al., 11+ rtah 22, 197 P. 2d 117 (1948), Thompson, et 
al. v. Nelson, et al., 2 Utah 2d 340, 273 P. 2d 720 (11954). 
There can be no private way of necessity over the 
land of a stranger. Leinweber, et ux. v. Gallaugher, et al. 
(Wash. 1940), 98 P. 2d 311. 
Fnion Pacific says that if its deed does not consti-
tute an agreement to indemnify it for this loss, "then the 
English language is inadequate to perform that function." 
The obvious answer to that contention is found in the 
numerous cases, cited by both parties in these briefs, 
where ordinary and commonplace words sufficed to 
frame a clear, distinct and undoubted agreement to in· 
demnify. The broad language chosen by the railroad here 
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fails in that purpose, if, in fact, such purpose ever exist d e . 
The Supreme Court of California, in the Vinnell case 
(supra) disposed of a similar complaint about the inad-
equacies of the language by this apt quotation from an 
earlier Calfornia case : 
" '
1The defendant itself wrote the provision 
into the contract for its own benefit. It could have 
plainly stated, if such was the understanding of the 
parties, that the plaintiff agreed to relieve it in the 
matter from all liability for its own negligence. As 
it did not do so, we resolve all doubt, as we should, 
in favor of the plaintiff, and hold that it was not 
the intent of the parties to give to the contract 
as written the effect claimed by the company.'" 
CONCLUSION 
The controlling facts, including the most favorable 
evidence the railroad could bring before the Court, show 
the parties did not discuss or negotiate the question of 
indemnity for plaintiff's negligence. 
The same facts show that parties did not have the 
intent to agree upon such indemnity, whether discussed, 
negotiated, or not. 
The same facts show the parties neither negotiated, 
discussed nor agreed upon the use of the crossing where 
the accident occurred nor the liability which might arise 
from such use. 
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The same facts clearly show the loss was due to 
and arose from the negligence of the railroad and not 
from the existence, operation or use of the pipe line. 
The cases on which plaintiff relies almost all contain 
some language tending to show an intent such as plain-
tiff would now infer from the absence of such language. 
Further, and unlike this case, almost all of them concern 
an agreement which was designed to cover the very 
place where the loss occurred, or the equipment which 
caused it. 
As a part of its argument, the railroad describes 
these parties as "major corporations." However, the law 
to be announced by this Court in its decision of this 
case will apply to all - from the giant corporation to 
the embattled farmer or rancher who seeks a right of way 
for pasturage. To the end that all our citizens, and 
not just the "major corporations,'' can understand the 
responsibilities a simple document may thrust upon them, 
this Court should reaffirm these basic and fundamental 
principles: 
( 1) a contract will not be rewritten by the 
courts; and 
(2) a contract will be strictly construed 
against the party whose contract it was; and 
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( 3) a contract will not be construed to pro-
vide for indemnity against one'g own negligenrti 
unless the intention to assume such responsihilit\· 
is stated in plain, unequivocal and unambiguou:, 
terms. 
These principles, when applied to the facts of this 
case, will demonstrate conclusively that plaintiff should 
not be indemnified and that the summary judgment 
should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
SKEEN, WORSLEY, SNOW & 
CHRIST'ENSEN 
Attorneys for Defendants-
Respondents 
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